Maciej Puczkowski Space

The first principle

September 10, 2026

The first principle

The world probably did not come into being in the sense in which we imagine coming into being. What I would like to examine, however, is the probability that something comes into being when nothing existed before.

I was prompted to do this by Dawkins, who said in one of his debates that “a simple principle explains the development of a complex universe better than God, because it has a greater probability of coming into existence”.

Even without any wider context, this sentence is, in my view, fundamentally flawed.

The first question that came to my mind was: “on what basis was this probability calculated?”. We are often overwhelmed by the weight of authority and nod along, assuming that things must be as the authority says, without hearing the problem in the words themselves. Dawkins appeals to science so constantly that it never occurs to us that the argument he uses might be entirely unscientific.

If we are talking about actual probability, then, as far as I know, we cannot calculate the probability of God coming into existence. As for the simple principle, I am less certain, but still certain enough to claim that the situation is similar. Unable to calculate the probabilities, we cannot compare them.

Let us imagine that there is nothing, absolutely nothing. Not only no matter or space, but also no principle that could govern them. And suddenly something comes into being. Without any probability, because there is no sample space. In this situation, the emergence of a simple principle is just as legitimate as the emergence of the whole fullness at once. When there is nothing and something is to come into being (because we know that something exists), then anything could come into being, and all scenarios are equally indeterminate. The length or simplicity of a hypothesis does not matter here, because there is no space in which it could translate into a chance. We cannot say what is more likely to come into being first.

The word “probability” in that sentence, therefore, did not refer to a mathematical function. It was rather a presumed chance based on intuition - not probability, but an “it seems to me”, backed by the notion that something small is easier to get out of nothing than something big. In other words, Dawkins did not answer the question “does God have a greater chance of existing than a simple principle?”, but a substitute question: “to have a lot, do you first need to have a little, or the other way round - to have a little, do you first need to have a lot?”.

Contrary to appearances, this rather caricatured question explains the difference between the two approaches. In one account of the origin of the universe, a simple principle bends and twists, wrinkling itself enough that after millions upon millions of years, on some planet, I can write this argument. In the other, there is a fullness of everything whose self-limitation produces partial beings. To put it yet another way: we can say that white light exists because its components exist and make it up, or that red arises by filtering all the other colours out of white.

Let us go one step further: Dawkins argues that a God capable of designing a complex universe would have to be at least as complex himself, and would therefore require an explanation.

At this point we can already say that this would be true if we did not have to assume the existence of something that does not require explanation, or more precisely, something that cannot be explained - it exists because it exists. When nothing existed and something came into being, then that is precisely what came into being. If God is as legitimate as the simple principle, then he does not require explanation, just as that principle does not. Whatever came first is inexplicable.

So what would better explain the origin of the universe? If we could find such a principle (and I know a thing or two, and from what I know, we cannot), one from which everything could be derived - even the fact that I would write this text, which would have been settled since the dawn of time, as eternalism holds - then that principle would explain everything perfectly. But if, despite all this, God came to us one day and said: “well yes, but you know… the thing is, I created that principle, because you have to start somewhere”, that would explain the universe at least as well, if not better.

Except that would already be revelation, wouldn’t it? Totally unscientific.

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